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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GIBBOXS & REED CO~IP ANY, a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-YS.-
S. Y. Gl'THRIE, ADAThi K. GRAFE ) 
and ROBERT I. LUDWIG, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
7850 
Brief of Appellants 
STATEMENT 
This is an action brought by Gibbons & Reed Com-
pany, a Utah Corporation, against S. Y. Guthrie, Adam 
K. Grafe and Robert I. Ludwig, to recover the sum of 
$15,356.75 with interest from April 2, 1951. 
The action was dismissed against the defendant, 
Robert I. Ludwig, and by order of Court, Thomas J. 
Bates & Sons were made parties to the suit. No service 
was made upon Thomas J. Bates & Sons, or either of 
them, and the judgment was entered against only the 
appellants S. Y. Guthrie and Adam K. Grafe. 
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The action is founded upon an alleged oral agree-
ment between the parties but the facts, as shown by the 
evidence, is that the action arises out of a written pro-
posal made by the plaintiff to the defendants ( appel-
lants) S. Y. Guthrie and Adam K. Grafe, to perform 
rertain exploratory and development work on some 
uranium mining claims, situate in the Henry Mountain 
Mining District, Garfield County, Utah, held by appel-
lants, under certain written agreements with one L. R. 
Weeks, Plaintiffs' Exhibit "A", Defendants' Exhibit 
"9". {Tr. 21) 
Said proposal was prepared after plaintiff had 
examined the premises and pursuant thereto plaintiff 
moved certain heavy duty equipment upon the ground 
{Tr. 24) employed one Harold Ekker to be general fore-
man or superintendent and authorized him to hire the 
necessary labor to carry out said proposal. (Tr. 20) 
Harold Ekker actually began his employment with 
Plaintiffs on or about February 9th (Tr. 202). At that 
time he discussed with George M. Jones, plaintiffs' agent 
the nature of his job and also on that occasion discussed 
the matter of the kind of equipment that would be neces-
sary and told Mr. Jones it would take very good equip-
ment in that out of the way area. Jones said they would 
send good equipment. 
Notwithstanding plaintiff had examined the premises 
upon which said work was to be performed and well knew 
that heavy duty equipment in good repair would be re-
quired, plaintiff sent equipment to the job in bad state 
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of repair and failed to supply the necessary parts and 
facilities for putting said equipment in workable con-
dition. Failure to properly repair and maintain said 
equipment caused repeated breakdowns with consequent 
frequent suspension of operations. (Tr. pages 203 to 
210 inc.) 
The unusable condition of the equipment was 
brought to the attention of Pat Gibbons, one of the 
owners of plaintiff's company on or about March 1st, 
1951, who assured appellant Grafe the equipment would 
be remedied and the work proceed. (Tr. 224-225) 
Gibbons failed to have the equipment repaired and 
on ~larch 12th appellant Guthrie went down to the prop-
erties at Hanksville and found the tractor (Cat) broken 
down. The necessary parts for repair of the equipment 
were not on hand and thereupon Guthrie requested the 
Cat operator, Vearl Boyer, to go to Salt Lake City and 
have Robert I. Ludwig notify plaintiff to come get its 
equipment off the premises, that appellants would take 
over the operations. ( Tr. 224-230) 
Respondents' proposal Exhibit ''A'' provides inter 
alia "The number of days the operation is continued is, 
of course, your option''. The estimated performance for 
the three operations is: (1) Four 20ft. deep holes drilled 
and checked per day. (2) Four 6 ft. deep holes stripped 
per day, and (3) one ton of material drilled, shot and 
moved per man per day. 
When respondents prepared and submitted said pro-
posal set forth above they were aware that appellants 
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were depending on the faithful performance of the opera-
tions outlined in order that appellants could determine 
whether they would exercise a certain option with L. R. 
Weeks on April 15th obligating appellants to take pos-
session of said mining claims and operate same or pay 
L. R. Weeks $1,000 per month for a period of one year 
(Tr. 42). 
Notwithstanding this knowledge of the urgency and 
importance of diligent and continuous work upon said 
mining properties respondents' own diary of perform-
ance Exhibit "F" shows a woeful disregard of the 
confidence placed in respondent by the appellants. This 
attitude is corroborated by the uncontradicted testimony 
of appellant Grafe on the occasion of his visit to the 
property when he found the equipment broken down 
and the chief Cat operator Boyer refused to continue 
operations with such equipment. (Tr. 126-127) 
Coming now to a comparison of what respondent 
accomplished and what the proposal Exhibit "A" re-
quired respondent to do-attention is directed to appel-
lants' Exhibits "1". The general summary and sum-
mary of work performed, prepared by Robert Deming, 
respondents' field supervisor. The data shown on these 
Exhibits is not contradicted by respondent-whereas, 
the proposal called for four 20 ft. deep holes drilled and 
checked per day, four 6 ft. deep holes stripped per day 
and one ton of material drilled, shot and moved per man 
per day, the evidence shows that in 225 man-days, Feb. 
9th to March 18th, Appellants' Ex. "11 ", respondent 
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drilled a total of eleYen holes with an aggregate of 250 
feet drilled. For this performance the respondent billed 
appellant $1~.~i36. I 3, but \Yhen payment was refused, 
filed suit for $13,33().13. The Court gave judgment for 
the amount billed, to-wit, $1~J~36.73 \Yith interest. No-
where in the Findings of Fact is there any statement of 
how the Court arrived at the amount of the judgment. 
Respondent placed in eYidence Exhibit '' B '' in sup-
port of its claim over the objection of the appellants, 
but failed to substantiate most of the items contained 
in the Exhibit by actual delivery of performance. See 
Robert Deming Deposition, admitted in evidence but 
not identified by Exhibit designation. Pages 43, 51, 61, 
69, 70. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Appellants rely upon the following points: 
Point No. 1. 
The Court erred in making and entering Conclusion 
of Law No. 2 to the effect that: 
The defendants, in breach of said agreement have 
never paid plaintiff for the expenses incurred under the 
terms of said agreement and that by reason thereof, 
plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of Twelve Thous-
and Three Hundred Fifty-six Dollars and Seventy-five 
Cents ($12,356.75) plus interest at six per cent (6%) 
from the termination date of said contract (March 18, 
1951). 
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Point No.2. 
The Court erred in entering in its Findings that 
the plaintiff was to build certain roads and trails on the 
property in question as set forth in No. 2, and the Court 
further erred in its Findings in No. 2 wherein the Court 
found that the plaintiff performed the preliminary and 
exploratory mining work with reference to the said 
uranium claims held by the defendants in said area in 
the Henry Mountains, Garfield County, Utah. 
Point No.3. 
The Court erred in entering in its Findings as set 
forth in No. 5 that as a further condition of said agree-
ment, the plaintiff placed on its payroll, at the request 
of the defendants, the necessary workmen to conduct the 
preliminary and exploratory mining work, all of which 
was done in accordance with said agreement. 
Point No.4. 
The Court erred in entering in its Findings in No.6 
that the defendants in breach of said agreement refused 
to pay the plaintiff for the work performed. 
Point No.5. 
The Court erred in entering in its Findings in No.6 
that the plaintiff from the commencement of perform-
ance of said agreement to the termination thereof had 
performed bona fidedly and in reasonable and complete 
conformance with the terms of the said agreement. 
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Point No.6. 
The court erred in not entering in its Findings, Con-
clusions and Judgment to the effect that respondent 
failed, neglected and refused to perform and conform 
to the terms and conditions of the respondent's pro-
posal (Exhibit "A") and that respondent's conduct of 
its operations under its said proposal Exhibit "A" was 
so inefficient and ineffectiYe by reason of worn and 
broken equipment and poor management that appellants 
were obliged to terminate said agreement and take over 
the operations themselves. 
Point No.7. 
The Court erred in admitting in evidence over the 
objections of the appellants Exhibits "B" and "C", the 
Operating Ledger and Payroll Journal, respectively, of 
the respondent. 
Point No.8. 
The Court erred in making and entering its judg-
ment herein, and the whole thereof, to the effect that: 
1. That the plaintiff be awarded a judgment in the 
amount of $12,356.75 with interest thereon at the rate 
of six per cent (6%) from March 18, 1951. 
Point No.9. 
The Court erred in making and entering Conclusion 
of Law No. 3 to the effect that: 
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The defendants are not entitled to any relief on 
their counterclaims, and that the same should be dis-
missed with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO.1. 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 2 TO THE EFFECT 
THAT: 
THE DEFENDANTS IN BREACH OF SAID 
AGREEMENT HAVE NEVER PAID PLAINTIFF 
FOR THE EXPENSES INCURRED UNDER THE 
TERMS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND THAT BY 
REASON THEREOF, PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN DAM-
AGED IN THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND 
THREE HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX DOLLARS AND 
SEVENTY-FIVE CENTS ($12,356.75) PLUS INTER-
EST AT SIX PERCENT (6%) FROM THE TERMI-
NATION DATE OF SAID CONTRACT (MARCH 
18th, 1951). 
It is the position of the appellants that the general 
rule is that the parties to a contract are bound to perform 
it according to its terms where they are sui juris, the 
contract violtaes no rule of law or public policy and no 
fraud or imposition has been practiced, particularly 
when it has been executed by the other party, although 
it may be difficult to determine the rights of the parties 
on a breach, or although the contract operates partially 
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or unjustly on one of the partil)s or entails a loss on him. 
C. J. 8., Yoll7, Page 930, St=>e. -!31. 
EXCUSES FOR XONPERFORMANCE 
The general rule is that, where a person by 
his contract eharges himself with an obligation 
possible to be performed, he must perform it, 
unless its performance is rendered impossible by 
the act of God, see infra Sec. 463, by the law, see 
infra Sec. 467, or by the other party, see infra Sec. 
-!()8, it being the rule that in case the party desires 
to be excused from performance in the event of 
contingencies arising, it is his duty to provide 
therefor in his contract. Hence, performance is 
not excused by subsequent inability to perform, 
by unforeseen difficulties, by unusual or unex-
pected expense, by danger, by inevitable accident, 
by the breaking of machinery, by strikes, by sick--
ness, by failure of a party to avail himself of the 
benefits to be had under the contract, by weather 
conditions, by financial stringency, or by stagna-
tion of business. Neither is performance excused 
by the fact that the contract turns out to be hard 
and improvident, unprofitable or impracticable, 
ill advised, or even foolish, or less profitable, or 
unexpectedly burdensome. Likewise, the party 
from whom the performance is due cannot assert 
that performance would be of no benefit to the 
other party. 
Page 946, C. J. S., Sec. 459. 
It is the contention of the appellants that the evi-
dence in this case clearly brings the respondent within 
the impact of the foregoing rule for there was no per-
formance of respondents' proposal upon which the Court 
could make conclusion of law No. 2 and certainly no 
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performance upon which the Court could properly enter 
conclusion of law No. 2 to the effect that the defendants 
(appellants) in breach of said agreement have damaged 
the plaintiff (respondent) in the sum of $12,356.75. 
A cursory examination of the evidence reveals that 
the proposal of the respondent to give it its most favor-
able light was to say the least very superficially per-
formed. This is clearly emphasized in the diary kept by 
Robert Deming, respondent's Field Supervisor and time-
keeper, which was introduced in evidence and is a part 
of the record under Exhibit ____ (not designated). Also see 
the testimony of appellant Adam Grafe (Tr. Pages 169 
to 172, inc.). 
Where one of the parties to a contract does not per-
form within the time specified and his performance within 
such time is essential, the other party is not obligated to 
perform his original promise and there is no right of 
action against such other party upon the contract, al-
though he may be liable upon an implied promise. 12 
American Juris prudence, Page 912, Sec. 349. 
The only theory upon which the trial Court could 
enter a judgment for the exact amount of the claim 
which was originally submitted by Gibbons & Reed Com-
pany to Guthrie and Grafe was full and good faith per-
formance of the terms and conditions of the proposal. 
Exhibit "A" $12,356.75 was the amount of the claim 
presented to Guthrie and Grafe after they had exercised 
their option to terminate the Company's operations at 
the mines. 
10 
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The proposal was t>xeeuted February 8, 1951. It 
was the first week in :March before any exploration or 
deYelopment work was under \Yay. The deadline at which 
the performance of the proposal could be of any benefit 
to the appellants was April 13th when appellants had to 
exercise or not their option with L. R. Weeks (Tr. 42). 
Almost 30 days had elapsed between February 15th and 
:Jiarch 12th, the date when Guthrie and Grafe gave notice 
of termination of the contract. :Measured in terms of 
tons of earth removed and footage of holes drilled by 
:Jiarch 12th not over 10% performance of the proposal 
(Exhibit "A") had been accomplished yet almost 50% 
of the estimated cost of the 60 day operation had assert-
edly been expended and claim for payment submitted. 
It is manifest from the trial Court's findings, Conclu-
sions and the Judgment rendered thereon that the Court 
would hold the appellants liable to respondent to the 
full extent of the estimated cost, as submitted in Exhibit 
"A", regardless of how much of the respondents pro-
posal was left undone at the end of the 60 day period. 
In other words the appellants as one of the parties 
to the contract are held and firmly bound to pay but 
there is no corresponding duty upon the respondent to 
perform in conformance with its proposal (Exhibit 
"A"). We have yet to find a single authority which 
supports the trial Court's concept of the evidence in 
this case or the construction given the liabilities of the 
parties under the contract. 
11 
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Appellants submit the following authorities which 
without exception, emphasize the necessity of perform-
ance in contracts such as the one involved in this case. 
NECESSITY OF PERFORMANCE 
(Ore. 1920) Though a party cannot rescind a con-
tract and thereafter recover damages for its breach, he 
can elect to treat a breach by the opposite party as ter-
minating the contract, and thereafter recover the loss 
he sustained by reason of the other party's failure to 
perform his agreement. (Taylor v. Tripp, 191 P. 1054, 
97 Ore. 611.) 
(Utah, 1919) Where a contract is entire, and remains 
executory in whole or in part, and one party commits a 
breach of his duty, and the other is not in default, the 
latter may rescind and be relieved from further per-
formance. (Pool v. Motter, 185 P. 714, 55 Utah, :l88.) 
(Cal. 1884) Where the performance of an executory 
contract by one party depends upon something to be 
previously done by the other, an action will not lie for 
nonperformance if default has been made in the accomp-
lishment of the preceding act. (Peasley v. Hart, 4 P. 537, 
65 Cal. 522.) 
(Cal. 1905) Civ. Code Sec. 1439 declares that before 
any party to an obligation can require another party to 
perform he must fulfill the conditions precedent imposed 
on himself. Plaintiff and others agree to subscribe 
various sums to a fund to secure a lease and in pros-
12 
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pecting certain land supposed to contain mineral; it 
being agreed that each subscriber should own an interest 
proportionate to his subscription. Thereafter the owner 
of the land granted to plaintiff and the others the right 
to enter on the land to prospect and mine for a certain 
term, the owner to receive a royalty, or the lessees were 
entitled to pay a sum in cash as full consideration for 
their rights. Plaintiff failed to make any of his pay-
ments, and after the discovery of mineral by the others 
he sued for a decree declaring him to be the owner of an 
interest. Held, that plaintiff was not entitled to recover, 
he having forfeited his rights, it being immaterial 
whether the agreement executed by the owner was a lease 
or a mere mining privilege, and the statute of frauds 
having nothing to do with the case. (Cameron v. Burn-
ham, 80 P. 929, 146 Cal. 580.) 
(Kan. 1897) A. enters into a contract with B., by 
the terms of which A. agrees to furnish some new 
machinery and put it with the old machinery already in 
the mill of B., and is to remodel said mill, and agrees to 
change it so it will do certain things, and B. agrees to 
accept and settle for it when the mill fulfils the agree-
ment of A. Held, that B. is not bound to accept and settle 
for it, and is not in default in the payments contracted 
for, until it fulfils the agreement. (1896) (Richardson 
v. Great Western Mfg. Co., 43 P. 809, 3 Kan. App. 445, 
judgment reversed Great Western Mfg. Co. v. Richard-
son, 4 7 P. 537, 57 Kan. 661.) 
13 
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In the obligation assumed by a party to a contract 
is found his duty, and his failure to comply with the 
duty constitutes the breach. 
Defendant was liable for breach of contract to irri-
gate, care for, and cultivate young pecan sprouts and 
trees, since such negligence was not failure to do things 
growing out of fiduciary relation of joint adventurers, 
but failure to do specific acts defendant had agreed and 
bound himself to do by written contract. (Lorden v. 
Snell, 39 Arizona 128, 4 Pac. 2d 392.) 
If a contract provides for a series of acts and actual 
default is made in the performance of one of them, 
accompanied by a refusal to perform the rest, the other 
party need not perform, but may treat the refusal as a 
breach of the entire contract and may recover accord-
ingly. It can make no difference whether a contract is 
partially performed. (Mobley v. New York L. Ins. Co., 
295 U. S. 632, 79 L. Ed. 1621, 55 S. Ct. 876, 99 A. L. R. 
1166; Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 44 L. Ed. 953, 20 S. Ct. 
780; United Press As so. v. National Newspaper Asso. 
(C. C. A. 8th) 237 F. 547, citing R. C. L.) (Lake Shore 
& M. S. R. Co. v. Richards, 152 Ill. 59, 38 N. E. 773, 30 
L. R. A. 33.) 
A working contract is, in the words of Corpus Juris, 
''one under which work or labor is to be performed in 
the erection, construction or repairs of some building, 
edifice, structure, or other work". 
14 
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The contract is to govern their respective rights, 
duties and liabilities, and by it these rights must be 
determined. (17 C. J. S. 333, Sec. 11). Utah Lumber 
Ys. James, 71 Par. 986, 25 Ut. 434. 
Contract consisted in part of certain specifications, 
working plans, and detail drawings. 
All material was to be thoroughly kiln-dried, hand-
smoothed and scraped. Was not a mere sale on inspec-
tion, was a building contract, obligating the dealer to 
furnish and deliver the material according to such plans 
and specifications. 
Obligation to perform in general. (C. J. S. 930, 
Sec. 451.) 
Performance of a contract has been defined to be 
such a fulfillment of its duties as puts an end to its obli-
gation by leaving nothing more to be done. (C. J. S. 
999, Sec. 494.) (McGuire vs. J. Neils Lumber Co., 107 
N. W. 130, 97 Minn. 293.) 
Performance of an obligation under a contract con-
sists of the doing of the required act at the time and 
place and in the manner stipulated by the terms of the 
contract. (N. Estrada, Inc. vs. Terry Texas Civ. app. 
293 s. w. 286.) 
To breach a contract implies a violation of a valid 
and subsisting obligation. (Russel vs. Stephens, Wash. 
71 Pac. 2d 30.) 
15 
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Anything so material and important as to defeat the 
purpose of the parties is breach of contract. (J. A. D. 
Andrea, Inc. vs. Dodge, C. C. A. Pa. 15, Fed. 2d 1003-
reversing D. ( ~- Dodge vs. A. D. Andrea, Inc., 10 Fed. 
2d 387.) 
A party is guilty of the first breach who first fails 
to do what he is contractually bound to do. (C. J. S. 999, 
Sec. 494~) 
Contracts for the performance of ·services require 
the exercise of good faith and integrity, and such special 
skill as the promisor has contracted to render. The 
promisor must be reasonably competent and reasonably 
diligent, but he is not liable for mere mistakes or errors 
causing incidental losses. 
vVhere there is not a compliance as a general rule, 
acceptance by the owner cannot be compelled, and the 
builder is not entitled to recover on the contract, at 
least not unless there is substantial compliance, or in 
other words, he cannot recover where, without the con-
sent of the owner, and to his detriment, he has substan-
tially varied from the terms of the contract, unless there 
Is legal excuse therefor. (Sec. 494, Page 1002.) 
A builder must perform his contract according to 
the terms of the plans and specifications, where there are 
any. Ordinarily, where a contract specifically states the 
method of construction, type, quality and strength of 
materials, and goes into detail as to what is to be done 
and the manner of doing it, the owner is bound by what-
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ever result is obtained, provided the specifications are 
followed. (La. Delaune vs. Granbino App., 161 So. 331 
Pa.; Tate-Jones & Co. v. Union Electric. Steel Co., 126 
.A. 813, 281 Pa. 448.) 
If, however, the contract states the results to be 
obtained, the details and methods of construction being 
left to the builder's discretion, the builder is bound to 
produce the desired results. 
POINT NO.2. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING IN ITS 
FINDINGS THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS TO 
BUILD CERTAIN ROADS AND TRAILS ON THE 
PROPERTY IN QUESTION AS SET FORTH IN 
NO. 2, AND THE COURT FURTHER ERRED IN ITS 
FINDINGS IN NO. 2 WHEREIN THE COURT 
FOUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF PERFORMED 
THE PRELIMINARY AND EXPLORATORY MIN-
ING WORK WITH REFERENCE TO THE SAID 
URANIUM CLAIMS HELD BY THE DEFENDANTS 
IN SAID AREA IN THE HENRY MOUNTAINS, 
GARFIELD COUNTY, UTAH. 
Appellants need only to refer to the language of 
Plaintiff's proposal in sustaining Point No. 2, for no-
where in said proposal is there a single word, phrase or 
clause relating to any construction of roads and trails 
on the property in question. Neither is there a word of 
testimony in the record to substantiate the finding that 
17 
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plaintiff performed the preliminary and exploratory 
work with reference to said claims. 
POINT NO.3. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING IN ITS 
FINDINGS AS SET FORTH IN NO. 5 THAT AS A 
FURTHER CONDITION OF SAID AGREEMENT, 
rrHE PLAINTIFF PLACED ON ITS PAYROLL, AT 
THE REQUEST OF THE DEFENDANTS, THE 
NECESSARY WORKMEN TO CONDUCT THE PRE-
LIMINARY AND EXPLORATORY MINING WORK, 
ALL OF WHICH WAS DONE IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH SAID AGREEMENT. 
Appellants challenge respondent to find a single 
word, phrase or clause in the agreement of the parties 
"Exhibit A" which even hints that appellants requested 
respondent to place anyone on respondent's payroll-
the evidence shows that appellants recommended certain 
persons to respondent as capable workmen but neither 
the written proposal nor any substantial evidence sup-
ports this finding. 
POINT NO.4. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING IN ITS 
FINDINGS IN NO. 6, THAT THE DEFENDANTS IN 
BREACH OF SAID AGREEMENT REFUSED TO 
PAY THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE WORK PER-
FORMED. 
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The evidence shows the plaintiff has not been paid 
for any of the work performed but nowhere is there 
any evidence in the record substantiating the claim of 
Twelve Thousand Three Hundred Fifty-six Dollars and 
Sen~nty-fiye Cents ($12,356.75) which plaintiff presented 
to defendants on the assumption that plaintiff had fully 
performed all the obligations of its contract to the date 
of termination, to-wit, :March 18, 1951. 
Defendants (Appellants) could not be guilty of 
breach where plaintiff (respondent) was guilty of the 
first breach. 
The proposal (Ex. A) on its face shows perform-
ance was to be completed within sixty days ( 60) or by 
April 15th, 1951. Thirty ( 30) days had expired of the 
60 day period when appellants discovered such superficial 
performance of the proposal had been done as to wholly 
satisfy the defendants (appellants) satisfactory per-
formance would not be accomplished in the remaining 
30 days, hence defendants (appellants) terminated the 
contract as provided in the contract itself. 
EFFECT OF FIRST BREACH.-It has been said 
that a party first guilty of a breach of contract cannot 
complain if the other party thereafter refuses to per-
form. Similarly, it has been said that the party who 
commits the first breach of a contract cannot maintain 
an action against the other for a subsequent failure to 
perform. (Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phos-
phate Co. (C. C. A. 6th), 121 F. 298, 61 L.R.A. 402.) (One 
who first wrongfully violates a contract has no standing 
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in court to recover for a violation of the contract by 
the other party thereto (Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. 
Searles, 85 Miss. 520, 37 So. 939, 68 L.R.A. 715) ). It 
It has also been said that where a contract is not per-
formed the party who is guilty of the first breach is gen-
erally the one upon whom rests all the liability for the 
nonperformance. (Anvil Min. Co. v. Humble, 153 U. S. 
G40, 38 L. Ed. 814, 14 S. Ct. 876.) It seems clear that 
the party first committing a substantial breach of a con-
tract cannot maintain an action against the other con-
tracting party for a subsequent failure to perform if 
the promises are dependent. (Norrington v. Wright, 115 
U. S. 188, 29 L. Ed. 366, 6 S. Ct. 12. (A. J. 12, Sec. 338, 
Page 894.) 
NEGLIGENT OR WILFUL CONDUCT.-One of 
the interesting questions that have arisen is whether 
negligent or wilful acts of the plaintiff are available as 
a defense. It may be said that in an action to recover 
damages for the breach of a contract, the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff ordinarily does not proclude 
his recovery, as would be the case in an action of tort. 
Such negligence rarely releases the defendant from the 
obligation to perform his contract, but is always to be 
considered in fixing the amount of the damages,-that 
is, so much of the damages as is attributable to the plain-
tiff's negligence should be excluded from the recovery. 
But although there is authority to the contrary, many 
decisions have affirmed the rule that a wilful breach of 
a stipulation in a contract bars recovery by the party 
guilty of the breach. (A. J. 12, Sec. 339, Page 895.) 
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APPROVAL OF PERFORMANCE 
GENERALLY.-The question what consttiutes com-
pliance with a contract which provides that the subject 
matter thereof shall be satisfactory to the party who 
promises to make compensation therefor presents two 
distinct questions, one being whether the latter must act 
in good faith in accepting or rejecting, and the other 
being whether he must act reasonably. As to the first 
there is ordinarily little difficulty. Such a contract does 
not make the promisor's mere declaration of dissatisfac-
tion conclusiYe. It requires an honest expression as to 
whether he is satisfied. He should fairly and candidly 
investigate and consider the matter, reach a genuine 
conclusion, and express the true state of his mind. He 
must not act arbitrarily or capriciously or merely feign 
dissatisfaction. He cannot avail himself of his own fraud 
to escape liability on his contract. It is only the actual 
existence, not the mere expression of dissatisfaction, 
regardless of its reasonableness, that can have this 
effect. The opposite view seems, however, to be enter-
tained by some courts. At least, the inference that the 
promisor's good faith cannot be inquired into seems to 
be justified by statements to the effect that in cases 
where it is stipulated that an article to be furnished 
shall unqualifiedly, be satisfactory to the party to whom 
it is to be supplied, the right to reject the article, as not 
being satisfactory, cannot be inquired into; but the 
party's own determination must be taken as final and 
conclusive. In such case it is supposed and such is the 
construction, that the party has reserved to himself an 
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unqualified option, and is not willing to leave his free-
dom of choice to any contention or to be subject to any 
investigation whatever. It is said that if a promisor 
thinks it is proper to enter into such a conditional con-
tract, it is not for anyone other than the promisee him-
self to say that he ought to be satisfied; that is a matter 
expressly reserved t ohim to decide for himself, and the 
motive or reasons for the decision, whether reasonable 
or unreasonable, good or bad, are placed by the contract 
beyond question or investigation. (A. J. 12, Sec. 340, 
Pages 340-341.) 
There is no substantial compliance or performance 
unless the work is sufficient for the purpose stated in 
the contract or accomplishes such result. (Dawson vs. 
:Myers, 26 Ohio Civ. Ct. N. S. 511, 9 C. J. Page 746, 
Note 63.) 
0"\vner cannot express dissatisfaction as a matter 
of mere caprice. (Sec. 508, C. J. S., Page 1085.) 
Strict and substantial performance. Substantial 
performance means not doing the exact thing promised, 
but doing something else that is just as good, or good 
enough for both obligor and obligee. (U. S. Dorrance 
vs. Barber & Co., C.C.A. N. Y. 262 F. 489. 
There must have been an attempt in good faith to 
perform. (State Bank of Monticello vs. Lauterbach, 268 
N. W. 918.) 
The non-performance of a material part of the con-
tract will prevent the performance from amounting to 
a substantial performance. (Same case as above.) 
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Substantial performance is performance of all im-
portant particulars. (Tex-ThlrBermett Ys. Smith & Mc-
Callin, 9 C, J. P. 743, note 40(a) ). 
POINT NO.5. 
THE CO"CRT ERRED IN ENTERING IN ITS 
FINDIXGS I~ NO.6 THEREOF THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF FRO~I THE CO~Il\IENCEMENT OF PER-
FOR~IANCE OF SAID AGREEThiENT TO THE TER-
MINATIOX THEREOF HAD PERFORMED BONA 
FIDEDLY AXD IN REASONABLE AND COMPLETE 
COXFORMANCE WITH THE TERMS OF SAID 
AGREEMENT. 
This finding of the court is so grossly unfounded 
in and unsupported by the evidence in this case that it 
hardly seems necessary to dwell at length in examining 
its incongruities. Here we have a highly specialized 
proposal to perform three distinct and clear-cut opera-
tions, to wit: 
1. Four 20-ft. deep holes drilled and checked per 
day. 
2. Four 6-ft. deep holes stripped per day. 
3. One ton of material drilled, shot and moved per 
man per day. 
Total cost for 60 days operation ________ $26,518.00 
(See Exhibit "A") 
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• 
Time was of the essence of these obligations, for 
the plaintiff knew at the time it executed the proposal 
that the defendants required the information to be 
gathered from such operations by April 15th, 1951 in 
order to exercise their judgment on the option with 
L. R. Weeks (Tr. 42) defendants stood to be obligated 
to L. H. Weeks for $1,000.00 per month for twelve months 
commencing April 15th, 1951, or execute the operating 
agreement and lease which had then been executed by 
defendants with said L. R. Weeks. As shown elsewhere 
in this brief, 30 days had expired of the 60 day period 
of the contract or proposal but the record discloses not 
more than 10% of the above specified obligation had been 
performed, yet the plaintiff submitted a claim for almost 
half of the estimated cost of the entire undertaking. 
How can the respondent claim under such a record of 
performance that its undertaking had from the com-
mencement of performance to the date of the termination 
thereof been bona fidedly and in reasonable and complete 
conformance with the terms of the proposal. :Manifestly 
this finding is clearly error. 
POINT NO.6. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ENTERING IN 
ITS FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT 
TO THE EFFECT THAT RESPONDENT FAILED, 
NEGLECTED AND REFUSED TO PERFORM AND 
CONFORM TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF 
THE RESPONDENT'S PROPOSAL (EXHIBIT "A") 
AND THAT RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT OF ITS 
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OPER . :\TIONS UN"DER ITS SAID PROPOSAL EX-
HIBIT • ·A'' 'V ~-\S SO INEFFICIENT AND INEF-
FECTIVE BY RE . :\SON OF WORN AND BROI(EN 
EQFIP"J[EXT AXD POOR ThL\NAGEMENT THAT 
APPELL~-\XTS WERE OBLIGED TO TERMINArrE 
S~-\ID AGREE"JIEXT AND TAI(E OVER THE OP-
ERATIOXS THE:\ISELYES. 
In support of Point X o. 6 the appellants respectively 
refer to the authorities and argument presented under 
Point Xo. -!. If appellants ha\ye any standing in this 
Court on Point K o. 4, then it must follow that this point 
is tenable. If appellants were entitled to substantial 
performance of respondent's proposal, which of course 
we most emphatically maintain under the terms of the 
proposal and the law governing the rights and liabilities 
of the parties, then it must follow as night the day, from 
the evidence in this case, that the Court should have 
entered a finding as set forth in this point, for if there 
were ever a clean-cut demonstration of feeble effort to 
perform in good faith the obligations of a contract it 
is clear as crystal in this case. If appellants did not 
commit a breach in refusing to honor and pay the bill 
presented by the respondent it was because respondent 
had been guilty of the first breach in failing, neglecting 
and refusing to perform and conform as required by 
its own proposal. 
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OPTION TO TERMINATE CONTRACT FOR 
UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE 
When so provided by the contract, one party may 
t.Prminate the contract in case performance by the other 
is um~atisfactory. Such a provision is analogous to a 
provision for performance by one party to the satis-
faction of the other, considered in Sec. 495 infra. The 
option to terminate the contract can only be exercised 
in good faith. Where a party to a contract is given an 
option to terminate a contract if dissatisfied, he may 
exercise his option without any practical or utilitarian 
reason where the right involved is one which is sub-
mitted to his taste or fancies, feelings, or judgment, but 
when it is apparent that the question of satisfaction 
relates to the commercial value or quality of the subject 
matter of the contract, it must be shown that the dissatis-
faction is reasonable and well founded. Dissatisfaction 
under such a contract may be predicated on delay in 
beginning performance as well as on matters occurring 
during performance. 
Where the contract provides that the work must 
be done to the satisfaction of the owner, and gives him 
a right to rescind if it is not done so, he cannot withhold 
his satisfaction unreasonably, and arbitrarily rescind 
the contract. An option given to the owner to discontinue 
the contract if he should deem that it would prove un-
profitable entitles him to the untrammeled exercise of 
his judgment so long as he acts in good faith and with 
reasonable basis for his belief. (17 C.J.S., Pages 890-1, 
Sec. 399). 
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'Yhere there is nothing to justify the contrary con-
struction, the general rule in regard to contracts wherein 
one party has the right to rescind if dissatisfied is that 
the party to be satisfied is the judge of his own satis-
faction, subjert only to the limitation that he must act 
in good faith. (See Yan Denmark vs. California Home 
Extension Ass 'n., 185 Par. 866, 43 Cal. App. 685. 
(l{an. 1898) 'Yhere an agreement requires a daily 
and continuous performance of the conditions of one 
party, and when he performs such condition he is entitled 
to the compensation at the end of each month, the per-
formance of each stipulation is a condition precedent to 
the continuing obligation of the contract.-(1896) (City 
of Osawatomie v. Mills, 45 P. 937, 4 Kan. App. 299, 
judgment reversed Mills v. City of Osawatomie, 53 P. 
470, 59 Kan. 463.). 
(Xev. 1919) A party who commits the first breach 
of a contract cannot maintain an action against the other 
for a subsequent failure to perform. (Bradley v. Nevada-
California-Oregon Ry., 178 P. 906, 42 Nev. 411.) 
(Ore. 1921) One who would recover on a contract 
must first show performance on his part. (Anderson v. 
Wallowa Nat. Bank, 198 P. 560, 100 Ore. 679.) 
(Wash. 1901) In an action on a special contract, the 
plaintiff cannot recover without showing performance. 
(Ingram v. Golden Tunnel Min. Co., 65 P. 549, 25 Wash. 
318.) 
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MEMORANDUM-Gibbons & Reed vs. Guthrie, et al. 
This memorandum is written with reference to the 
business records of Gibbons and Reed, and introduced 
in t~videnee at the trial. 
Exhibit B pertains to what the plaintiff denominated 
aH supervision and overhead expenses. Exhibit C is their 
payroll journal. Exhibit 10 is their labor summary, and 
Exhibit 3, a rental. Exhibits B and C were admitted at 
page 108 of record. My notes do not now reflect the 
point at which Exhibits 10 and 3 were admitted. I find . 
no objections in the record to the introduction in evi-
dence. 
POINT NO.7. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVI-
DENCE OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF THE APPEL-
LANTS EXHIBITS "B" AND "C", THE OPERAT-
ING LEDGER AND PAYROLL JOURNAL, RESPEC-
TIVELY, OF THE RESPONDENT. 
The plaintiff brought this suit to recover money 
expended by it in the performance of a contract which 
is characterized in plaintiff's pleadings, and in remarks 
of counsel as an oral contract. At page 56 the plaintiff 
introduced in evidence a written proposal made by it 
to the defendants to do and perform certain types of 
work on certain mining claims. The proposal which is 
dated February 8, 1951, and which is Exhibit 9, was 
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that the plaintiff would do and perform three things 
or types of operations: 
1. Drill the flat areas . 
. -, Ripping and stripping overburden. 
3. Drifting into ore bodies. 
The total cost for the performance of these three 
items or types of operation was put by the plaintiff in 
its proposal at $26,518. In view of the position taken 
by plaintiff's counsel at the trial, it may be well to state 
in negati\e terms the defendants' attitude or position 
regarding his contract. The proposal was not that the 
plaintiff would rent the defendants equipment or pro-
vide them with labor and carry the labor on plaintiff's 
payroll, but that as stated in the proposal, which is the 
only evidence in the record as to the terms of the con-
tract, to do and perform within a 60-day period the three 
operations set out by it in detail in its proposal of Feb-
ruary 8, 1951, Exhibit 9. Whether the contract is, 
strictly speaking, an oral or written contract is imma-
terial. The proposal, Exhibit 9, offered and introduced 
by plaintiff, is the only evidence of the contract, and the 
case was presented and tried to the trial court on the 
premise that the proposal was in fact the contract be-
tween plaintiff and defendants. 
In the light of the foregoing, the defendants now 
address themselves to the question of proof of perform-
ance by the plaintiff, of the contract-for without proof 
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of performance, or ability to perform, it is fundamental 
that the plaintiff may not recover a judgment against 
the defendants. The plaintiff introduced certain of its 
n•<·onls and books of account in evidence. Counsel for 
plaintiff and the trial court both appeared to have 
:tHHUmed that the entries on the books of the plaintiff, 
and on other of plaintiff's business records constitute 
proof that the plaintiff performed the proposals set 
forth by it in its proposal of February 8, 1951. 
The law, however, is to the contrary. We admit that 
hooks of account and business records are admissible 
in evidence if a proper foundation is laid. The probative 
value of such records is indeed another matter. The 
books of account and the records introduced by the plain-
tiff were supported only by the testimony of plaintiff's 
witness, Ed M. Shea, assistant secretary-treasurer of 
the plaintiff corporation. :l\Ir. Shea did not testify as to 
the performance of work by the plaintiff, but only that 
he was in charge of the keeping of the records. His 
knowledge, so far as the record is concerned, is confined 
solely to the maintenance of records in the office of 
plaintiff, and not as to the performance or non-perform-
ance of any work in compliance with the proposal, under 
which the plaintiff offered to do the three matters above 
specified for the defendants. Whether these records 
were properly qualified for admission in evidence in the 
absence of a showing by the witness that he had knowl-
edge that the things and matters referred to in the 
records were actually done and performed, is for hte 
Court to determine. It is stated in Jones Commentaries 
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on Evidence, Second Edition, Vol. 4, Page 3330, Par. 
1801, as follows: 
"TlH• courts haYP fn•qlWlltly C'Xprt'HHPd the 
opinion that shop books are quite unsatiHfaetory 
as evidence and should be suhjeeted to clost> 
serutinv. It has been said that books of account 
are rec.eivt•d only upon the presumption that no 
other proof exists; that tlwy are the weakest and 
most suspicious kind of evidence, and that ad-
mission of such matter is a violation of one of the 
first principles of the law of evidence, which is 
that a party shall not, himself, make evidence in 
his own favor." 
What is the plaintiff's evidence that within sixty 
days from the time that the plaintiff undertook to carry 
out the proposal it diligently prosecuted the drilling of 
the flat areas, or the ripping or stripping of the over-
burden, or the drifting into ore bodies 1 There is no 
evidence of due performance of the contract by the 
plaintiff. On the other hand, the record is replete with 
references to a D Cat, where it came from, the freight 
involving transportation, whether it would or wouldn't 
work, of airplane rides for which plaintiff appears to 
have charged defendants $300 or $400, and which item 
seems to be included in the judgment of plaintiff re-
covered in the trial court, even though the trial judge, 
at page ______ , held that plaintiff could not recover this 
item. 
There is other evidence as to who was bossing the 
job, but where is the evidence as to the amount of drill-
ing done on flat areas, or the stripping off of the over-
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burden, or the drifting into ore bodies, which were the 
things that the plaintiff contracted to do for defendarJs? 
There is no evidence of this in the record and the lack 
thereof cannot be overcome by the office records of 
plaintiff. 
POINT NO.8. 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND EN-
TERING ITS JUDGMENT HEREIN, AND THE 
WHOLE THEREOF, TO THE EFFECT THAT: 
1. THAT THE PLAINTIFF BE AWARDED A 
JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF $12,356.75 WITH 
IN'rEREST THEREON AT THE RATE OF SIX PER 
CENT (6%) FROM MARCH 18, 1951. 
In support of this Point appellants are content to 
refer to and request the Court to consider the argument 
and authorities presented in this brief under points 1, 
4, 5 and 6. If, however, this Court should determine 
under the law and the evidence applicable to the case 
at bar, that the respondent is entitled to some relief 
it is the position of appellants under all the authority 
that respondent is not entitled to the amount of the 
judgment entered in this case, hut must be content to 
rest its case on the principal of quantum meruit or the 
reasonable value of the benefits which came to appel-
lants by reason of the operation of respondent in its 
effort to comply with its covenants under the proposal 
(Exhibit "A"). Under this theory it was the duty of 
the trial Court to make a finding clearly appraising 
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and defining the value of the benefits conferred upon 
the appellants arising out of the operations of the 
respondent from the day respondent undertook to pPr-
form to the dny when appellants saw fit to terminate 
:such operations. 
POINT NO.9. 
'rHE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING CONCLrSIO~ OF LAW NO.3 TO THE EFFECT 
THAT: 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 
ANY RELIEF ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM AND 
THAT THE SA:JIE SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITII-
OUT PREJUDICE. 
The appellants were entitled to terminate the opera-
tions of respondent for lack of diligence and for shawdy 
performance. The proposal provided an option to ap-
pellants to take over any time they desired to do so, 
but the law requires dissatisfaction with performance 
to be founded in good reason and not caprice. We sub-
mit there was ample good reason for appellants to ter-
minate respondent's operations and take charge them-
selves. If this be so, it follows that any damage sus-
tained by appellants on account of respondent's failure 
to perform should be recouped. If the law requires appel-
lants to pay any part of the claim of respondent the 
appellants should be entitled to recoup their damages 
as set forth in their counterclaim, and the Court erred 
in dismissing same. See 12 Am. Juris., Sec. 353. 
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SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE OF 
PERFORMANCE 
( U tab, 1908) Though a building contractor may not 
depart from the terms of a contract and recover as upon 
a quantum meruit, a substantial compliance therewith 
in good faith entitles the contractor to recover on the 
eontract, with a right to the owner to recoup any dam-
ages sustained through the contractor's failure to liter-
ally comply with the contract. (Foulger v. McGrath, 95 
P. 1004, 34 Utah 86.) 
(Utah, 1921) Under a contract for the erection of a 
building according to agreed plans and specifications, 
the law contemplates a substantial, but not punctilious, 
compliance therewith; the contractor not being per-
mitted to profit by noncompliance with the contract, nor 
the owner to reap the benefits of the added value to his 
property by reason of labor performed and materials 
furnished by the contractor. (Stephens v. Doxey, 198 P. 
261, 58 Utah 196.) 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the points discussed herein, appel-
lants submit that the judgment of the trial court award-
ing damages favor of respondent in the sum of $12,356.75, 
with interest at 6% from March 18th, 1951, together with 
costs, is in error and should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILES 
Attorney for Appellants 
34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
